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This study is one of a number done by academic and other research institu-
tions for the Department of State as part of its external research program. The
program is planned and coordinated by the Department of State Research Council
and managed by the Office of External Research in the Bureau of Intelligence and
Research. It is designed to supplement the Department's own research capabilities
and to provide independent, expert views to policy officers and analysts on ques-
tions with important policy implications.
On many occasions in recent years, both private citizens and government
officials have talked andwritten about the trend toward increasing interdependence,
with complex and shifting relationships, among the "actors" on the world scene.
For obvious reasons, the emphasis usually is placed on economic relationships,
although we are all aware that interdependence increasingly is apparent in other
spheres as well- -political, strategic, cultural, and so on. Indeed, one of the prob-
lems for any student of interdependence is posed by the linkages between or among
such sectors.
As they thought about official and private studies and discussions of inter-
dependence, a number of Department of State officers became convinced that at
least some aspects of the phenomenon merited more serious or extensive scholarly
attention. Do social scientists, they asked, have concepts and methods that can
give us a more adequate understanding of the extent andnature of interdependence?
Can they provide us with better means for checking assumptions that inform much
of foreign policy?
The suggestion for a "conceptual and methodological" study of interdepen-
dence came from Mr. Herbert J. Spiro, of the Department's Policy Planning Staff.
The detailed terms of reference for the study, designed as a guide for institutions
interested in submitting researchproposals on a competitive basis, were developed
by Mr. Spiro and Mr. Pio D. Uliassi, of the Office of External Research, who
served as the project monitor. Both drew generously from the comments of other
Department officers.
We in the Department of State have already profited from the effort to define
our own policy-related research interests in a more precise way from our meetings
with the research team at M. I. T. and from the draft versions of this -study that
have been quite widely disseminated within our establishment. Our hope now, as
it was when the project was first conceived, is that the published study will stimu-
late additional fruitful discussion and independent work on the problem of inter-
dependence by private social scientists.
E. Raymond Platig, Director
Office of External Research
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Washington, D. C. 20520
This study was supported by the Department of State under Contract #1722-
320084. Views or conclusions contained in this study should not be interpreted as
representing the official opinions or policies of the Department of State.
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FOREWORD TO STUDY
ANALYZING GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE
In the summer of 1973 the U. S. Department of State awarded a
contract to the M. I. T. Center for International Studies to conduct a
year-long study that would, in the words of the R. F. P., "describe
evolving patterns of interdependence in a multipolar world-and develop
new methods for projecting and appraising such patterns. "
Given a projected level of effort of only nine professional man-
months for the study, our governing research principle was to make
maximum use of existing comparative advantages of the researchers
involved, drawing to the greatest extent possible on previous or con-
current work they and their graduate students were doing. (It must
however be said that all of us found ourselves entering new intellectual
ground as our research proceeded.)
It was thus agreed that Professor Hayward R. Alker, Jr., would
review the scholarly literature for issues, themes, approaches, and
problems bearing on interdependence, and that he would also take
responsibility for drawing conclusions concerning appropriate research
methodologies. Professor Alker, drawing on substantial research
papers on specific scholarly controversies, prepared (with Ann Alker)
Chapter II of Volume I of the report. His methodological review
appears as Volume III, in which Professor Nazli Choucri has coauthored
the concluding chapter. Among the working papers developed in the
course of that part of the project were the following, which are avail-
able on request from the M. I. T. Center for International Studies:
Lily Gardner, "Interdependence, Independence, Dependence,
and Integration: Whither Western Europe?"
Fabio Basagni, "The New 'Political Economy' Controversy"
Ann Alker, "The Limits to Growth Controversy"
Richard Kugler, "Strategists and Their Critics: The United
States National Security Policy Controversy"
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Professor Nazli Choucri took responsibility for developing a case
study on energy interdependence, with some focus on the Middle East,
that would serve the threefold purposes of: suggesting and applying an
approach potentially useful in other sectors or geographic regions;
illustrating some of the analytical problems, issues, and findings
typical of scholarly interdependence controversies; and supplying
some policy-relevant insights. Her report is bound separately as
Volume II of the report. Professor Choucri also coauthored Chap-
ter IV of Volume III. She wa's assisted throughout her study by
Vincent Ferraro, who contributed valuable research assistance,
editorial help, and substantive criticism. Chapter V of Volume II
was written with the collaboration of Ijaz Gilani. Major working
papers, also available on request, are:
Vincent Ferraro, "Competing Transnational Energy Regimes"
Ijaz Gilani, "Interdependence and Community- Building Among
Competing Regimes of the Arab World"
The third dimension of the study was the chief preoccupation of
the undersigned, who also acted as coordinator of the project. My
own approach follows a generally policy-oriented perspective. In
Chapter I of Volume I, I sought to parse out the meaning of inter-
dependence so that it might be approached with more clarity; in Chap-
ter III, I endeavored to offer the outlines of a policy analysis leading
to conclusions--which are my own--regarding some desirable policy
directions. In the course of this research I asked Ann Alker to prepare
a brief background paper on U. S. Nonfuel Mineral Import Practices,
which as a useful assembly of data is included as Appendix A to Volume
I. I also asked Steve R. Pieczenik, who in addition to being a practi-
cing psychiatrist is a doctoral condidate in the M. I. T. Department of
Political Science, to see what possibly relevant insights concerning
dependency situations might be drawn from the psychiatric literature.
His brief but provocative response is also included, as Appendix B
t- Volume I.
Although final responsibility remains with the cited authors, each
of the principal authors read and commented on each other's contri-
butions for this report, and we are all grateful for the help so received.
Dr. Choucri and I benefited from the helpful criticisms of our draft
chapters by David A. Kay and Amelia C. Leiss, and I further profited
from a review of my chapters by William Diebold, Jr. Professor
Alker's work was critiqued in preliminary form by Robert 0. Keohane
and Ramkrishna Mukherjee. His research for Chapter III of Volume III
vi
was assisted by Scott Ross. Finally, we had the opportunity to consider
numerous comments from officers of the Department of State who
reviewed the report in draft form.
While the contract did not call for a summary to be prepared, I
increasingly felt the need for one, given the complexity of the subject
matter and the fact that, despite the project's modest size, we were
producing considerably more written material than we had anticipated.
We therefore commissioned Irirangi C. Bloomfield, who has in the past
performed numerous precis and editorial tasks for the Center, to pre-
pare a summary volume, which we have denominated Volume IV.
My colleagues and I are grateful to Pio D. Uliassi of INR/XR
for his tactful and understanding performance of the role of Project
Monitor. We are very indebted to Jeanne Amnotte and to Dovianna
Barrens, who succeeded her, for devoted and skillful handling of the
manifold tasks of Project Secretary.
Lincoln P. Bloomfield
Project Director
Cambridge, Massachusetts
November 1974
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SUMMARY OF CHAPTER I, VOLUME I
THE SEMANTICS OF INTERDEPENDENCE:
A POLICY PERSPECTIVE*
There is no generally accepted definition of interdependence,
factually or conceptually.
A. Types of Interdependence
Interdependence can be defined in terms of environmental
''commons,'' or mutual nuclear forebearance, but the crucial new
foreign policy questions grow out of economic and resource relation-
ships. The most complex mutual dependencies are where the latter
interact with military security.
The massive U. S. power which makes relations with its major
allies so asymmetric is felt to be a virtue when the Soviets are
threatening. During detente it becomes a source of strain. U. S.
relations with Latin America and the Middle East also intermix mili-
tary security and economic activity along a sliding scale of Cold War
threat perception. However, military considerations dominate East-
West relations, and also affect some resource dependencies. Else-
where economic relationships dominate.
Particularly as nations seek the autonomy to pursue domestic
welfare policies, economic and resource dependencies will directly
influence political relationships and thus in the end will affect ultimate
issues of war and peace.
B. Interdependence as a "Fact"
U. S. awareness of interdependence escalated with the oil crisis
in 1973-74. Other such crises are now predicted. The significant
trends appear to be:
*Chapter I is by Lincoln P. Bloomfield.
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1. Food
The poorer countries' present dependence on food imports
may double by 1985, with the U. S. supplier role expected to expand.
However, on the three postwar occasions when world famine was pre-
dicted, U. S. surpluses quickly developed and world prices fell.
2. Trade
World trade rose 15% in 1973, twice the previous annual
average. The Atlantic countries' share of non-Communist exports is
rising, but the trend is to deepening regional interdependence in both
hemispheres. U. S. dependence on foreign resources is also rising:
LDCs account for one-third of U.S. trade.
3. Foreign Investment
In 1968 LDCs harbored only half as much of the total foreign
investment stock as advanced nations, a disproportion that is widening
even for the United States vis-a-vis Latin America. Eighty percent of
U. S. investment in Europe is direct; 70% of European investment in
the United States is in portfolio form.
4. Multinational Corporations
MNCs earn outside their home countries one-quarter of the
GNP of the non-Communist world. U. S. -based corporations account
for one-third of all the foreign -affiliates and produce abroad five times
what they export from the United States, representing the dominant
form of U. S. involvement in the world economy. MNCs are concentrated
in a few developing countries. The extreme case of foreign penetration
is Canada, which feels threatened by loss of control over its economic
life.
5. Nonfuel Mineral Resources*
The United States is completely dependent on foreign sources
for, e. g., manganese, chromium, and cobalt. Nevertheless, substi-
tutions are technically possible (at considerable cost) and the market
as at times past may be capable of generating unanticipated supplies
and new technology.
*See Appendix to Volume I, entitled "A Note on United States
Nonfuel Mineral Import Practices."
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C. Interdependence as a "Good"
U. S. policy views the growing linkages as not only inevitable but
also desirable in fostering consensus and restraining unacceptable
conduct. The United States officially accepts as facts of life the
dominant U. S. economic role, the growing "North-North" relation-
ships, and the beneficial role of the MNCs in bringing technology,
skills, goods, and services to the LDCs. "Optional" interdepend-
encies have been deliberately created to further larger political
designs (EEC, COMECON), and short-range goals of strategic
advantage, ideological gain, monetary relief, counter-balancing or
diversification (e. g., U. S. S..R. - Cuba in the early 1960s, U. S. -
Egypt, 1974). In U. S. -Soviet relations, the option is pursued by both
sides as an alternative to unwanted confrontation and unattainable
friendship, and seems justified not only by mixed historical evidence
but by political imperatives in this era.
D. Interdependence as a "Bad"
Third World spokesmen and many Western intellectuals view
"interdependence" as a codeword for economic bondage. They see
equity, social justice, and "economic democracy" negated by the
widening gap between affluent and poor societies, and the failure of
the masses, rather than just the elites, to benefit from the MNCs.
(See Chapter II. )
Comparable criticism applied to relations among the advanced
nations reflects the sense of penetration experienced by U. S. trading
partners who fear erosion of cultural identity and sense of national
self. The process of interdependence is seen as escalating tensions
over loss of national and societal autonomy, threatening defeat of
national social and economic goals, virulent nationalism and eventually
conflict. These negative costs, real or perceived, are increasingly
persuasive to policy analysts of the center.
E. Interdependence as Perception
Perceptions of dependency can generate insecure feelings, with
potentially explosive security consequences. Like strategic deter-
rence, the game is played on the basis of educated guesses about how
others perceive the reality one sees. Even if asymmetry is an
illusion, it is the perception of it that will be acted on. Possible
parallels between the behavior of nations and of individuals (which
rarely fit but may do so in this case) are drawn in Appendix B.
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F. Interdependence as Balance
What matters most for mutually satisfactory relations is the
degree to which interdependent relations are (or are perceived to be)
symmetrical or asymmetrical. The key is asymmetry. We ought to
try to identify the "deficit" in a given relationship by making a "net"
assessment and considering whether it can be balanced by substantive
or psychological policy actions. (A crude technique for doing so is
suggested.)
At one extreme is the stark one-sidedness of U. S. economic
relations with poorer countries (petroleum producers excepted).
At the other extreme, the deliberately fostered "optional" economic
interdependence with the Soviet Union is marginal to the symmetric
strategic balance and not a dominant factor.
The more delicately balanced interdependencies combine eco-
nomic and security factors which together are difficult to "net out"
since military security is also ultimately measured by how secure or
insecure the parties feel. Yet an overall assessment would reveal,
for example, that despite superficial similarities in the relationships,
the Japanese are far more sensitive about their security dependence
on the United States than are the West Europeans. Gaullism appears
to have supplied a quantum of self-esteem to redress the balance, and
in addition Western Europe has diversified its economic relations.
Some relationships (e.g. , U.S. -Saudi) turn out to be more sym-
metrical and less threatening than either side at first perceived (see
Volume II). It is more difficult to draw conclusions from a heavily
loaded case such as the U. S. -Canada. Although the intensity of con-
tacts and penetration might in some historical cases have led to
closer political ties, relations have been deteriorating. Despite
comparable asymmetries, the smaller Western European countries
strongly support a united Europe. One hypothesis is that the U. S. -
Canadian interdependency has crossed a threshold of penetration
beyond which the units must merge or else reduce the overload on the
more vulnerable partner striving to preserve its autonomy and culture.
Conceptually, interdependence is best defined as a two-way
dependence between states or enterprises possessing things of value
to others and thus able to indulge or threaten each other with those
benefits.
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SUMMARY OF CHAPTER II, VOLUME I
FOUR INTERDEPENDENCE CONTROVERSIES:
CONTENDING SCHOLARLY PERSPECTIVES*
A. Why Review Scholarly Analytical Controversies?
Attention to divergent analytical perspectives can make clearer
what orientations toward global interdependence are realistically
possible, and it can help design approaches to emerging public issues.
B. Which Controversies Should We Review?
Chapter I identified three areas of interdependence central to
policy: security, ecological, and political-economic. To illuminate
conceptual and methodological issues, a single scholarly controversy
from each area has been selected: deterrence; the "Limits to Growth"
debate; and the trade, investment, and payments arguments associated
with Cooper's The Economics of Interdependence. European integra-
tion literature may also have American relevance.
C. The National Security Debate
1. Strategic Perspectives
a. Strategist Thinking: Foreign Policy
Strategist thinking is marked by close government/academic
ties and by "Realpolitik, " i. e. , conflict is unavoidable. Elites, making
rational choices, should base policy on the U. S. self-interest (cf.
Brodie, Kahn, Kissinger, Wohlstetter).
Current strategy seeks a global modus vivendi under rules of
nutual restraint in a balance of power situation. Some strategists
say mutual restraint fails to foster functional cooperation or to solve
basic economic and social problems.
*Chapter II is by Ann Alker and Hayward R. Alker, Jr.
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b. Strategist Thinking: Military Defense Policy
The conceptual framework of the current flexible response
strategy has changed from cost-benefit to a systems design approach,
and from a unilateral to a mutual assured destruction deterrence strat-
egy accompanied by cooperative crisis management, collective security
and arms limitations.
2. Critical Perspectives
a. Radical Left
Either the United States is imperialistic in the Marxian
sense, motivated by profit, with structural capitalism making the
decisions (cf. Kolke), or the bureaucratic structure is imperialistic
in forging a pro-American world order (cf. Barnett). To both, deter -
rence theory is ideological and lacks scientific stature.
b. Behavioralist Critics, Including Peace Researchers
These critics share a community-building orientation (cf.
Boulding, Deutsch, Rapaport, Singer) that rejects the notion of inevi-
table conflict. Others see deterrence theory more as doctrine than
science, and suggest a loss of critical empirical focus when scholars
work too closely with government.
c. Government-Oriented Critics
Accepting the basic policy framework, politically influential
critics (cf. Allison, Halperin) focus on governmental process in decision-
making and often recommend cost-benefit analysis based on applied liberal
welfare economics.
D. The Limits to Growth Controversy
1. The Focus of Discussion
Projected exponential growth in five interrelated variables --
population, capital investment, natural resources, investment in
agriculture and pollution- -will collapse the system when their growth
collides with a fixed environment (cf. Forrester, the Meadowes', et al).
Some state of "no growth" or "sustainable growth" must be substi-
tuted, but current institutions are inadequate for this purpose.
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2. Critical Perspectives
Critics decry the models (cf. Sussex group), the authors' values
(cf. Falk), and their assumptions. Most think at least a two-world
North-South model is necessary to pinpoint issues of distribution,
dependency, and responsibility. The central problem is engendering
alternative allocations of scarce resources.
E. The New Political Economy Controversy
1. Coping With Market Interdependence and Dependence
Growing advanced nation inter-sensitivities, North-South eco-
nomic relations, and the role of aid agencies, international banks, and
MNCs, are issue clusters linked by a new urgency about questions of
autonomy and about whether inequitable North-South relations may be
paralleled within U. S. and European national borders.
2. Contending Economic Orientations
a. Market-Oriented Liberals
This group advocates undisturbed,efficient market opera-
tions except for government correction of market distortions (cf. Harry
Johnson).
b. Institutional Liberals
These approve autonomy and cooperation, regulation of
direct foreign investment and the depoliticization of economic activity
(cf. Cooper, Keohane, and Nye).
c. Leftist Liberals
This group (cf. Myrdahl, Prebisch, Hirshman) seeks redis-
tribution through elite-sponsored institutional change.
d. Dependency Theorists
Dependency theorists see dependencies as a reflection of
international capitalism and advocate more or less revolutionary
policies (cf. Cardoso, Bodenheimer, Bonilla, Petras).
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e. Radical Political Economy
This orientation is Marxian theorizing in an Anglo-American
environment but does not envisage revolutionary political action (cf.
Hymer, Baran, Sweezy).
f. West European Marxists
They either (1) desire trade between equals and are struc-
turally but not politically revolutionary (cf. Emmanuel), or (2) regard
economic institutions and classes as the actors and predict collapse of
the system (cf. Mandel).
F. European Integration Controversies
Left and right have both produced anti-integration analyses,
emphasizing either domination or destruction of the nation state.
1. Integ ration Options
2. Integration Theories
a. Neofunctionalists
Neofunctionalists (cf. Haas) stress the bargaining process
among economic groups being translated by supranational leadership
into community institutions. Ideas have developed on responses to
EEC members' increased economic sensitivity.
b. Transactionalists
Transactionalists (cf. Deutsch) focus on all transactions
(not just between groups) and believe high interdependence can induce
both conflict and cooperation. Pluralistic or amalgamating integrative
processes are necessary but not inevitable.
c. Postfunctionalists
Postfunctionalists (cf. Morse, Young, Ruggie) sense more
devolution of authority taking place than supranational evolution and
show interest in public goods theory as a way of exploring public sector
adjustments to market mechanisms.
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3. Traditionalist Critics
The nation-state continues to be decisive; federation is the
preferred form of integration (cf. Aron, Hassner, Hoffman). Func-
tional cooperation is sought but not integration at the high policy level.
4. Left Critics
Interdependence is a condition for integration but only when all
world groups can collaborate as equals (cf. Galtung). Orthodox Marx-
ists (cf. Mandel) see capitalistic integration as not yet reaching the
point requiring international working class revolution.
G. Convergent Preoccupations and Divergent Orientations
Present in each controversy are (1) North-South/rich-poor/strong-
weak issues, and (2) left- right/East-West/capitalism-socialism
divisions. Other interdependence-related issues are (3),autonomy and
invulnerability considerations, (4) loyalty-identity issues, (5) the extent
to which (inter)dependence generates positive or negative benefits, and
(6) realism versus idealism in community-building. Associated common
preoccupations are with (1) piecemeal regional or functional order-
building efforts, (2) structure- sensitivity, (3) ecological consciousness,
and (4) the increasing complexity of policy analyses.
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SUMMARY OF CHAPTER III, VOLUME I
SOME POLICY IMPLICATIONS*
A. Four Insights
Four insights with major importance for policy emerge from the
evidence: (1) that problems are created, not by the fact of interconnect-
edness, but by the dependency experienced; (2) that the principle of
"critical mass" operates--too little mutual dependence inhibits under-
standing, too much overloads the relationship unless political integra-
tion follows; (3) that interdependence is not automatic but optional--at
a cost; and (4) that policy is determined by whether asymmetry is felt,
which suggests compensating for the deficit psychologically as well as
tangibly, to reduce interdependency frictions.
B. Some Policy Options
Where unbalanced, asymmetric interdependence is experienced
or perceived, the United States can opt:
1. To reduce the risks inherent in raw materials dependencies,
for example, by:
(a) Development of improved political relations
(b) Coercive use of U. S. military or economic power
(which may however be irrelevant to capital flows,
production cutbacks, or cartel repricing)
(c) Internationalization of the resource, or lesser
collective arrangements for its management
2. To seek to become less dependent by:
(a) Disengaging generally from the Third World
(b) Pursuing strategies toward raw materials producers
of product substitution, lowered consumption, and
diversified supply sources
*Chapter III is by Lincoln P. Bloomfield.
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3. To increase mutual dependency--the current strategy vis-
a-vis the U. S. S. R. , the C. P. R. and, increasingly, the
Gulf oil-producers.
4. To achieve autarky or self-sufficiency. Some self-suffi-
ciency is sound, but all-out autarky, entailing import
barriers, subsidized export incentives, etc., is
historically counterproductive.
5. To manipulate interdependence asymmetry as a lever to
achieve political purposes, as the Arabs used the oil
embargo, and as the United States could use food. This too
conflicts with the goal of tension reduction and of a more
cooperative world order, and would eventually be counter-
productive.
C. Toward a Strategy of Interdependence
Interdependence problems are created by unbalanced dependen-
cies. The goal should be to convert specific asymmetries to true inter-
dependence by eliminating the "deficit" or, failing that, to transform
the relationship itself.
The conceptual basis for interdependence policies needs clarifi-
cation before an ensemble of coherent strategies can be purposefully
pursued. Contemporary interdependence arguments reflect deep value
differences between those who accept as good and natural the current
economic and security dependencies, and those who wish to change what
they interpret as excessive U. S. political dominance or corporate
control over foreign economies. Specific value conflicts are: growth
versus the quality of life and conservation of finite resources; capital-
ism and free enterprise versus socialism and economic democracy
(although in practice both so far pursue "more is better" rather than
"enough is best"); economic efficiency which argues for state and/or
corporate control versus the desirability of maximum participation in
the management of international economic, social, and technological
functional interdependencies. The need seems clear to shape and ex-
plain revised norms of moderation and sharing.
Given a better thought-through conceptual foundation for a U. S.
interdependence strategy, four elements of a strategy present them-
selves, aimed at remedying "net deficits" in relationships:
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1. "Decoupling" those linkages with potential for excesssive
pressure. The U. S. military and economic presence can
be reduced, investment disconnected from U. S. vital
interests, regional cooperation encouraged, MNCs regu-
lated, commodity agreements and a world food reserve
established to meet the most acute vulnerabilities. In
becoming "less conscious" of the poorer nations, the
United States can best be guided by humanitarian motives
in redefining its interests and seeking a new role toward
them.
2. Fostering the mutuality of the links between the United
States and the oil producers by increasing their stake in
a sound U. S. economy. A similar approach to China should
be studied.
3. Applying psychological insights where incremental security
and economic policy adjustments are inadequate. Toward
Japan, for example, priority actions would include: more
prior consultation, encouraging Japanese leadership in
regional economic organizations, assistance in obtaining
semi-permanent UN Security Council membership, and a
(non-Asian) UN peacekeeping role. Canada requires a new,
serious study.
4. Handling collectively many functions formerly managed
nationally. Currency, trade, investment, communication,
nuclear security, environmental "commons, " and MNCs
are phenomena that ignore borders. Also, state control
implies eventual recourse to the "interstate war system."
Multilateral management is a necessity, whether by the UN
or by whatever institutions a new age of socio-political
invention can contrive.
It remains unresolved whether economic and monetary issues
should be dealt with at a global, regional, or subregional level. If
attacked individually, however, two principles might be applied.
Economic and cybernetic theory suggests that the number of policy
instruments be at least as great as the number of objectives, if all
objectives are to achieved. And, where early action is needed, "coali-
tions of the willing" can be organized topic by topic without waiting for
universal agreement.
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The State Department's capability to handle cross-cutting
problems such as energy, monetary issues, trade, ocean resources
management, and technology transfer must be upgraded. More basic
is that political leaders be willing to accept international arbitration
and adjudication and multilateral decision-making even when apparently
contradicted by the short-term national interest. The internal costs
will be high of acting on Secretary Kissinger's injunction to "transform
the concept of world community from a slogan into an attitude. " Yet
without a new order of creative political and bureaucratic activity, the
hazards of present trends may ultimately transform economic inter-
dependence into a problem of military security.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Resource Producers
Not applicable
- A L W A Y S
Counterproductive
U S E F U L - - -
Decreasingly
applicable
Not efficacious
- - - COULD LESSEli STRAINS ARISING FlROM ASYMMETRIC D)EPENDENCY - - - -
Reduce Risks
a. Improve political
relations
b. Coercion
c. Internationalize
Lessen Dependency
Increase Mutual
Dependency
Autarky
Manipulate Asym-
metry Through
Linkage Strategies
Not applicable now
(excessive future
dependency would be
undesirable)
Current U. S. -Soviet
strategy, based on
persuasive logic
- - - HIS TORItCA LLY
Theoretically possibl
to gain economic
advantages by
threatening insecur-
ity or withholding
exports, but chancy
Unproductive
. S. Interdependency Options
Would avoid unwanted
intervention conse-
quences and reduce
current tensions
Undesirable interms
of lessening U. S.
involvement
Desirable, through:
product substitution,
alternative energy
sources, lessened
consumption, diver si
fication of supply.
Very desirable to
balance relations
better, increase
stake in stability of
flows
C O U N T E R P R O D UIC T I V E - - - - - -
Possibly counter-
productive politically
Possible Western
countermeasures
available in future
(but becomes in-
creasingly Option 3)
Reducing level of
mutual dependency,
if high, should reduc
strains
Danger of producing
overload in current
atmosphere
TABLE 1. Major U]
Allies Communists LDC s
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SUMMARY OF INTRODUCTION, VOLUME II
ENERGY INTERDEPENDENCE*
Both the exponential growth in global energy usage and the reali-
zation that this results from population growth as well as from tech-
nological advance are now well recognized. The flow of energy across
national boundaries has become one of the most salient issues of our
time, pointing to patterns of interdependence as nations try to meet
energy demands or trade their own resources. In this context inter-
dependence refers to mutual sensitivities and vulnerabilities as patterns
of interaction among nations change with respect to (a) economic issues
and their political implications, (b) national security and strategic
objectives, (c) integration and community-building, and (d) environ-
mental imperatives. The ties that bind nations along each of these
dimensions can be discerned from an analysis of energy flows.
Energy consumption increased on the average of 6% a year over
the past decade. The United States alone averaged a 3.1% growth in
demand throughout the past twenty years. The United States is the
world's largest producer and consumer of energy; the fact that consump-
tion now exceeds production, necessitating energy imports, has become
a major issue. Assured access to resources is a paramount national
concern. Equally critical are issues such as the cost of extraction of
domestic versus foreign sources and the price to be paid for each.
Energy imports are critical also to Western Europe, which has
some self-sufficiency in solid fuels and, more dramatically, to Japan,
which is entirely dependent on foreign sources for both energy and
mineral resources. The Soviet Union is a net exporter of energy,
which permits some flexibility in energy policy. China alone seems
to have developed a balanced energy budget requiring neither imports
nor markets.
All nations are gradually recognizing a common predicament:
how to accommodate seemingly irreconcilable objectives in ways that
are consistent with the producers' preferences and priorities and which
ensure the consumers access to energy. The present malaise reflects
*Volume II is by Nazli Choucri with Vincent Ferraro.
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a common search for more viable patterns of interaction, a search
shaped not only by basic "realities" but by perceptions and preferences
as well. The issues will differ substantially in the longer range. They
will pertain to a system based on alternative sources unconstrained by
the finiteness of the underlying resources, where political and economic
costs are acceptable, where safety is minimally assured, and where
technological solutions are feasible.
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SUMMARY OF CHAPTER I, VOLUME II
THE PARAMETERS OF THE WORLD PETROLEUM NETWORK
Petroleum is presently the largest single source of energy and
the basis for almost all the organic chemicals for which no commer-
cially viable substitutes exist. However, the extraordinary rise in
consumption cannot be sustained; given present conditions, known
reserves are ample only until the turn of the century.
A. Changing Parameters and Evolving Crises
The world petroleum network has been transformed. The MNCs,
which hitherto controlled the flow patterns, now provide intermediary
services for the new major actors -- the producing and consuming
countries. Remarkable changes have occurred with respect to environ-
mental hazards, patterns of alignments, the politicization of petroleum,
and the manipulability of prices. A new ethos of preserving a valued
resource and new discoveries (e. g., in the North Sea and South China
Sea) inject other elements, while the producers' ability to absorb a
large-scale flow of revenues has limits.
For producers and consumers, the issues of embargo; of supply
shortages caused by increasing demand and the reluctance to increase
production; of price; and of shortages of auxiliary facilities such as
tankers, refineries, pipelines, etc., are intimately related to economic
and political issues, to national security, to environmental considera-
tions, and to potential community-building. There are differences
among producers, among consumers, and between producer and con-
sumer. Oil company policies, however, are dictated mainly by the
profit motive. Formerly agents of the consumers, they are now agents
of the producers.
The projected growth in demand in the next fifteen years is
approximately 1.3% - 3.8% in the United States and between 3.5% -
5.5% for the rest of the world, reflecting spreading industrialization
and continued population growth in the LDCs. The United States,
Western Europe, and Japan consume about 80% of the world's production.
By 1985 they are expected to consume the same percentage of a base
doubled in size.
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B. Patterns of Production
The exponential rise in output is one of several dramatic changes
in the past twenty years. In 1955 the United States led producers with
43% of the world total, followed by Venezuela with 15%. By 1972 the
United States still led, but with 18%. The Soviet Union was next with
15%. Middle Eastern and North African fields accounted for 41%.
Saudi Arabia will soon replace the United States as the world's leading
producer.
There were also declines, due to environmental concerns which
depressed demand for high-sulfur crudes, concerns revolving around
the Arab-Israeli dispute, unstable prices, national security concerns
which tended to restrict U. S. domestic production, and long-range
concerns to preserve a valued economic resource.
C. Patterns of Consumption
In 1957 30% of total energy consumption was in liquid form; by
1971 it was 42% and rising. French reliance on oil rose from 24% to
64% in the same period, German from 10% to 52%, British from 15%
to 43%, and Japanese from 26% to 72%. The United States and the
Soviet Union, with more alternatives available, maintained a relatively
stable rate.
Tension may arise with the Western allies and Japan, where the
projected growth of petroleum markets is substantially greater than
in North America. With increase U.S. reliance on imports, they fear
that the MNCs may give the United States priority.
D. Patterns of Crude Petroleum Exports
From 1955 to 1970 total exports rose 361%. Petroleum today
comprises 20% of total world trade. The patterns have changed: the
Western Hemisphere is no longer the focal point of exports, and the
rank ordering of exporters is dramatically different:
1955 1956
Venezuela 35% Iran 14%
Saudi Arabia 15% Libya 13.6%
Iraq 13% Saudi Arabia 12.7%
Iran 3% Kuwait 12.3%
Vene zuela 11%
-19-
In 1970 the top five were separated by only 3%. That this did not
lead to a buyer's market was due largely to OPEC, founded in 1960.
OPEC members are predominantly Middle Eastern, sharing a common
heritage and political bond vis-'a-vis Israel. Economic motives are
more critical to OPECs' solidarity than political motives, but priorities
are sufficiently diverse to preclude a successful cartel.
OPEC controls a vital product for which no substitutes exist in
the short run. Members are not competing for access to consumer
markets. The parameters of permissible behavior remain to be defined.
E. Patterns of Crude Petroleum Imports
U. S. imports, which, for economic, political, and security
reasons, traditionally ranged from 10% - 20% of total consumption,
nearly doubled in the past three years, due to stagnation of the domestic
oil industry, declining natural gas production, nuclear plant delays,
rising economic productivity, and environmental requirements. In
mid-1973 imports accounted for 35% of consumption and will likely
increase to 54% by 1980.
The trend is similar in Western Europe and Japan, countries
which, as new producers entered the market, have sought to diversify
their sources to reduce their dependence on any single supplier. How-
ever, diversification may enhance the possibilities of united action by
the exporters who can also diversify their markets.
F. Interdependencies of Petroleum Flows: A Preliminary Assessment
The degree of mutual vulnerability and sensitivity between
importer and exporter is revealed by the symmetries and asymmetries
of the relationship. Two major consumers exhibit clear trade asym.-
metries favoring the importing countries: the United States vis -a-vis
Canada (48% of U.S. needs represent 98% of Canada's petroleum ex-
ports), and France vis -'a-vis Algeria (26% of French imports account
for 59% of Algerian exports). Two major consumers exhibit asym-
metries favoring the exporting countries: the United Kingdom vis -'a-vis
Kuwait (25% of British imports account for only 15% of Kuwaiti exports),
and-Germany vis-'a-vis Libya (41% of imports account for only 26% of
exports). In the case of Japan the symmetries suggest a high degree
of interdependence and possibly a conscious Japanese policy toward
that end.
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SUMMARY OF CHAPTER II, VOLUME II
THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF
THE WORLD PETROLEUM SYSTEM
A. The Changing Role of Multinational Corporations
U.S. corporations control over half the world's proven reserves
and carry out 80% of exploration investments for oil and gas.
The multinational corporations (MNCs), which have traditionally
controlled access, flow, and prices, have gradually become inter-
mediaries between consumers and producers. Their influence was
built on tight control of exploration policies, a monopoly of technology
and skills, and their access to capital. The recent reactions of the
producers to these factors have caused the price and supply problems
of the consumers.
The interdependencies are extensive. The producers cannot
manipulate prices without using the corporations, nor can they collect
revenues directly. The corporations have proven an effective buffer,
safeguarding somewhat the interests of both producers and consumers,
but always motivated to maximize profit.
The companies' operations in the producing countries are in fact
nonprofit--oil is extracted and transferred to the shareholder companies
and affiliates at a fraction more than cost. The profit is made when
the oil is transferred at posted prices to other affiliates. Higher host
government revenues therefore do not mean lower profits to the oil
companies.
There are however conflicts of interest. The corporations seek
maximum profit before their leases expire; the producers have concerns
about future reserves. The United States prohibits assistance to states
which expropriate U.S. holdings without compensation and is com-
mitted to protect its nationals and their property overseas (a $24 billion
petroleum investment in 1974). Yet there is in return no formal com-
mitment by the corporations for assured access to petroleum. The
Soviet Union's emerging role in the Middle East as a potential supplier,
consumer, and middleman may furnish added sources of friction.
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The MNCs thus face some imponderables. With no short-term
alternatives to Middle Eastern oil, pressure on these sources will
intensify. The magnitude of the producers' revenues is increasing
their ability to manipulate the structure. OPEC has entered the
petroleum network as a challenger of established patterns. As con-
sumer countries also become active members of the system, the
corporations are increasingly becoming targets of both producer and
consumer dissatisfaction.
B. Evolving Institutional Response: The Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries
OPEC's development can be traced to (1) price-cutting by the
MNCs, undertaken without consulting the producers; (2) the possibility
of lower cost competition from new producers; and (3) the producers'
improved technical knowledge and skills, enabling them to make more
knowledgeable decisions about prices and taxes.
OPEC's membership controls 85% of the oil available for export
to the non-Communist world. It has succeeded in deterring price
competition among its members, increasing profits, gaining participa-
tion arrangements with the oil companies, winning compensation for
inflation and devaluation in the consuming countries, and conserving
oil reserves for the future. Oil revenues for OPEC members will
increase to $65 billion in 1974, some 90% higher than five years ago.
By 1985 they will reach half a trillion dollars -- about half the current
U.S. GNP. Whatever the consequences of such large-scale transfers
of funds, they do enhance OPEG's political and economic leverage.
OPEC has not succeeded in identifying and reaching agreement
on its members' priorities in unifying petroleum policies, nor in
stabilizing petroleum prices. It differs from producers' cartels in
that it controls a product that is irreplaceable in the short run; the
producers are not now competing for larger shares of the market; their
needs for revenue vary extensively; price manipulation does not depend
on coordination among the producers, nor are the incentives for price-
cutting--so characteristic of cartels--uniformly extensive.
The large-scale transfers of funds to the producers, the attendant
Western balance of payments problems,-and potential economic disloca-
tions result from increasing petroleum prices, but they cannot be
attributed to cartel-like behavior on OPEC's part. Individually moti-
vated price increases would have produced the same reactions. Thus
"breaking up the cartel" would not necessarily reduce the effectiveness
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of OPEC members in their efforts to attain some control over evolving
institutional arrangements among producers, consumers, and interna-
tional oil companies.
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SUMMARY OF CHAPTER III, VOLUME II
ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE:
TRADE ASYMMETRIES AND OPTIONS
A. Total Trade Flows: The Global Context of Economic Relationships
Patterns of trade flows and petroleum flows are remarkably
similar. The 1971 figures reflect three important factors. First,
mutually directed trade represented a much larger fraction of the
producers' trade than of the consumers', revealing the degree of
penetration by the industrialized nations. The United States, the United
Kingdom, and France (Germany less so) exhibited pronounced asym-
metries. Japan appeared to be seeking interdependence by allocating
a fraction of its domestic market commensurate with its penetration
of the producers' markets. Second, there was much diversification
in consumers' trading patterns with the producers. Only Japan
allocated shares of imports proportionally to shares of exports. Third,
the diversification of trading partners was not paralleled by the pro-
ducers, with the exception of Iran. For the rest, dependence of pro-
ducers on consumers far exceeded that of consumers on producers.
B. Alternatives and Options: Commodity Trade Between Petroleum
Producers and Consumers
The ability to deny an opponent access to critical goods or ser-
vices is a function of the alternatives available to the opponent, and
they are strongly constrained by prevailing patterns of interactions.
The U. S. trade figures for 1972 give the impression that U. S.
exports are more important to the oil producers than theirs are to the
United States. But U. S. exports are concentrated on four major com-
modities, three of which (electric machinery, nonelectric machinery,
and transport equipment) are also major exports of Germany, Japan,
the United Kingdom, and France, the other major consuming countries.
Thus redirection of trade is possible. As regards the fourth com-
modity, cereals and flours, the one potential alternative to the United
States is the Soviet Union. The criticality of this commodity highlights
the harsh realities of the resulting interdependencies.
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SUMMARY OF CHAPTER IV, VOLUME II
ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE:
REVENUE FLOWS AND THE TRANSFER OF FUNDS
Rising prices have implications for the consumers in terms of
balance of payments and for the producers in terms of revenue sur-
pluses. Fund transfers have unintended results which are beyond the
control of any single nation.
A. First-Order Effects: Increases in Petroleum Prices
Middle Eastern producers in the last three months of 1973 uni-
laterally raised the price of crude petroleum from $3. 01 to $11. 65 per
barrel. Government revenues expanded from $1. 76 to $7. 00 per barrel,
signaling a fourfold increase in annual revenues. Transfers of funds in
1974 are expected to reach $55 billion plus the increased profit of the
oil c ompanie s.
Analysts agree on two facts: (1) that the cost of production lies
far below price, leaving a wide margin for potential accommodation;
and (2) that supply and demand do not govern world petroleum prices.
The upper limit on prices is likely to be set by the commercial avail-
ability of alternative sources of energy.
B. Second-Order Effects: The Balance of Payments Problems for the
Consumers
For the major consuming nations, oil imports will likely cost $50
billion more in 1974 than in 1973. By 1985 the oil bill may well reach
$200 billion, or 20% of all trade. The United States is expected to con-
sume about one-third of energy supplies with imports accounting for
one-half of this amount. The U. S. balance of payments deficit could
increase by $20 billion or more.
Britain faces a current deficit of up to $10 billion, Italy at least
$6 billion, France about $4 billion, and Japan at least $7 billion. Over
several years, 'the size of the oil bill matched against reserves ($173
billion, including gold) augers severe monetary dislocations. Theo-
retically, five or six countries could wind up owning all foreign exchange.
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C. Second-Order Effects: Surplus Revenues for the Producers
Petroleum represents over 90% of the total trade of Abu Dhabi
and Qatar (100%), Libya (99.9%), Saudi Arabia (96.8%), Kuwait (95.5%),
Iraq (93.7%), Venezuela (90.3%). It is unlikely that oil revenue accounts
for less than 50% of total revenues in any oil-producing state. The
dependence of the producers on petroleum revenues more than matches
the consumers' dependence on petroleum imports. In those terms
neither has alternatives to the other as trading partners, but the pro-
ducers' dependence appears greater, until time is considered. The
consumers could not long withstand a denial of petroleum in the absence
of alternative sources of energy; the producers might for some time
withstand a denial of revenues, depending on such factors as population,
rate of change, economic policies, priorities, and so forth. This range
is increasingly affecting the structure of the world petroleum system,
which was hitherto responsive only to consumer demands and the multi-
national companies.
The Middle East has the world's fastest growing store of capital.
Per capita reserves already range from one to twenty times that of the
United States. Even with some dampening of prices, decreases in
demand, and increased OPEC imports, an OPEC surplus of $240 billion
by 1980 appears plausible. The producers' ability to absorb this surplus
revenue is determined by their domestic attributes, the level of economic
development, population, and the rate of growth, all of which differ sub-
stantially among them.
D. Third-Order Effects: Policy Options and Manipulables
The options available to consumers include (1) promoting exports
to the producers, (2) reducing capital outflows and encouraging inflows,
(3) seeking investment in the producers' economies, (4) seeking invest-
ments by the producers, (5) accommodating their mutual deficits by
collaborative financial polices, and/or (6) reducing consumption
markedly.
For producers, the options are to some degree reciprocal and
include (1) absorbing surplus revenues by imports from consumers,
(2) restricting production, (3) investing in the consumers' economies,
and/or (4) collaborating with other producers in financial transactions
with the consumers.
For the consumers, even the United States, export promotion
would have limited economic impact. Encouraging large-scale invest-
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ment by the producers, and repatriation of oil company profits would
contribute more. Or currencies could be devalued equalling the .overall
trade deficit, e. g. , for Japan 10%-20%, for the United States about
13%. Devaluations of this magnitude would necessitate joint monetary
planning. Reducing consumption would call for new goals, habits, and
attitudes and is thus a longer term policy.
E. Third-Order Effects: Policy Constraints on Producers and
Consumers
Producers such as Iran and Venezuela have the population base
and skills to absorb surplus revenue internally. Eventually this
domestic investment will generate locally produced goods that compete
with imports and can even be exported. Others, such as Kuwait, Libya,
and Saudi Arabia will, by necessity as well as preference, invest the
surplus in the major financial markets.
The more producers become integrated into the global economy
as large-scale investors, the more likely they are to coordinate their
investment policies with those of the advanced nations. Producers such
as Iran promote downstream operations at home and export refined
products. Others, such as Saudi-Arabia, seek to participate in such
operations abroad and export crude petroleum. This could lead to sub-
stantial investment in consuming countries, but probably not enough to
absorb Saudi Arabia's excess earnings. Moreover, mass foreign
ownership might not be acceptable to the consumers.
The present regime is predicated on national initiatives and incen-
tives. Yet conventional trade will not compensate adequately for the
deficit, and there are serious constraints on the magnitude of capital
flows and investments in the major financial markets. Cooperation
between producers, consumers, and international monetary institutions
is thus essential.
F. Fourth-Order Effects: Economic Impacts on Other States
The immediate implications of price increases are most serious
for developing countries that are not oil producers. These include
reduced demand for primary products and thus lower earnings, short-
ages in crucial fertilizers, reduced inflow of capital, and an impaired
ability to attract security loans.
OPEC has been unresponsive to these problems but some individual
members have made adjustments, e. g., Iran vis -'a-vis India.
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SUMMARY OF CHAPTER V, VOLUME II
INTERDEPENDENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
The emerging interdependencies among oil-producing countries
can be revealed by focusing on the center of petroleum power--the
Arab states of the Middle East.
A. Critical Differentials in the Middle East
Differences in the attributes and capabilities of the Middle Eastern
countries have fostered interdependencies that transcend a shared heri-
tage and cleavages that make coordinated petr oleum policies increas -
ingly fragile.
Population size ranges from Egypt's 35.9 million tp fewer than
500, 000 in the Gulf. Resource-rich countries such as Kuwait and
Saudi Arabia have the smallest populations and the least need for, or
capacity to absorb, surplus revenue. Iran and Algeria, with large
populations and the institutional bases for channeling revenues into
economic projects, are major producers today but have smaller
reserves. Further, the most populated and resource-poor, such as
Egypt, are the most technologically advanced and have the lowest growth
rate, whereas Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the most resource-rich and
least populated, have high growth rates and need technical and related
skills.
These basic imbalances have prompted large-scale interstate
population movements, a redistribution of knowledge and skills, and an
awareness of the potential for interstate cooperation.
B. Cleavages and Constraints
For those OPEC members with large populations, high prices
outweigh the benefits of OPEC membership. Saudi Arabia alone seeks
price reductions and may defy OPEC to do so. With a small population
and one-third of the world's proven reserves, a Saudi decision to sell
oil at high volume and low price would put pressure on OPEC to lower
prices.
It is ironic that Saudi Arabia with the least need for revenues,
without capacity to absorb them, and with no depletion worries, is in
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control of OPEC's pricing policies. Iran, Algeria, and others face
constraints. Libyan efforts to avoid rapid and unplanned exploitation,
may be ideologically motivated but make economic sense in the absence
of large reserves and absorptive capacity.
Efforts toward community-building in the region have a long
history. More recently there has been official realization that where
political objectives differ so substantially, a new order must be predi-
cated on diversity rather than. uniformity.
C. New Policy Directions
The futility of inter-Arab conflicts was finally confronted after
the humiliating 1967 war with Israel. No Arab leader, nor ideology,
was left with any prestige to protect. The Israelis had defeated Nasser-
ite Egypt, Baathist Syria, and Hashemite Jordan with equal ease.
Political power was dispersing. Saudi Arabia was emerging as the new
economic power, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and to an
extent Libya, as the new revolutionaries, Algeria as the technocratic
leader, and Kuwait as the research center.
With the acquisition of technical and managerial capabilities and
an understanding of how balance of payments problems and surplus
revenues converge, the Arabs were able to use their key resource for
political purposes. Nevertheless policies have not been highly coordi-
nated. Iraq cooperated in the military sphere in 1973 but not in the
embargo; Libya helped Egypt financially but did not agree with Sadat's
moderate policy toward Israel; Saudi Arabia led the oil embargo but
made no military contribution; Algeria, Morocoo, and Tunisia gave
full political support but only token military aid. An evolving consensus
regarding the acceptability of such limited commitments is providing
the basis for a fragile coordination of policy.
D. Regional Interdependence and Evolving Consensus
By the end of 1973 the Arab states had begun to collaborate suc-
cessfully on the major political issues between them--ideology, the
dispersion of power, community-building, and the issue of leadership.
Smaller states, no longer dependent on large ones, could now contribute
to regional collaboration. The core leadership of Egypt and Saudi
Arabia was moderate, opening avenues for potential resolution of both
the Israeli impasse and the petroleum problem.
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The reduced emphasis on symbolic politics permits an accom-
modation with Israel to be sought by negotiation and, indeed, the poten-
tial for settlement with Israel has had a unifying effect on the Arab
community.
E. Community -Building, Evolving Interdependence, and Competing
Regimes
Political objectives differ. Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the Gulf
states are concerned about preserving traditional values. Egypt,
Algeria, Tunisia, and Lebanon stress economic development. Syria,
Iraq, and Jordan seek security. Yet none can impose its order on
others. Saudi Arabia's role is now pivotal rather than peripheral.
In changing from a hegemonial to an interdependent power, Egypt drew
on the different attributes and capabilities of its neighbors to reach
consensus on the Israeli war. Despite the differing political orientation
of Algeria and Saudi Arabia, their oil ministers visited the consumer
capitals together--the new technocrats. Syria's security concern has
yieldedto a disengagement agreement with Israel--a sign of an emerging
pragmatism.
This diversification of activities permits commitments to com-
munity-building that are more limited, pragmatic, and purposeful than
earlier efforts at unification. These interdependencies may enable
Saudi Arabia to convince the Arab members of OPEC not to raise
petroleum prices further. OPEC policies of course must also reflect
the view of Iran, Venezuela, and Nigeria. Iran is nervous of Arab
unity and needs revenues. The other two are likely to side with Iran but
neither can substantially influence OPEC decisions.
F. Regional Influences on Global Interdependence
The major external influence is the United States, which seeks an
Arab-Israeli settlement and an unimpeded flow of petroleum. It is
unclear whether a unified Arab posture would help or hinder these goals.
The reserve displayed by the Soviet Union toward Egyptian-Saudi
cooperation may indicate a favorable view of evolving regional inter -
dependence. Western Europeans, however, are concerned mainly with
petroleum supply, and while there is little consensus among them there
are also fewer tensions in their relationships with the producers.
The producers will not unilaterally reduce prices drastically, nor
will the consumers withdraw their demands for lower prices. The only
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reasonable solution is mutual accommodation. The other option is to
develop alternative sources of energy. If producers persist in raising
prices, investments in alternatives will accelerate; if prices are
lowered, they will decline. The producers are to this extent able to
influence the energy policies of the consumers.
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SUMMARY OF CHAPTER VI, VOLUME II
A SUMMARY ASSESSMENT OF
INTERDEPENDENCE IN THE WORLD PETROLEUM SYSTEM
1. An extraordinary rise in world petroleum consumption
triggered the alleged "crisis". in supply. The key "crisis" issues
are: reluctance to expand production capacity, price, the scarcity of
auxiliary services, and the possibilities of further embargo. All are
manipulable, with varying social and economic costs.
2. New oil fields and new producers have altered production
magnitudes and diminished the role of. the Western Hemisphere as a
prime exporter.
3. Reliance on oil imports has increased, and there has been
a trend toward the diversification of import sources. The resulting
trade asymmetries may favor either exporter or importer.
4. Changing flow patterns are mirrored in the changing roles
of the oil companies and OPEC.
5. Total trade patterns reflect penetration of the producers by
the industrialized nations and effective division of market control of the
producers. Both concentration and diversification are reflected in the
producers' trade with consumers.
6. There are substantial risks involved in using the producers'
dependence on U. S. cereals and flours as leverage on other issues.
7. The balance of payments issue illustrates the intricate inter-
dependencies among actors in the system.
8. The near total dependence of producers on oil revenues
more than matches the consumers' dependence on imports.
9. Networks of interdependence are developing among the
Middle Eastern countries with implications for the world petroleum
system.
10. Solutions to balance of payments/surplus revenue problems
will require each party's cooperation.
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Thus, neither producers nor consumers can "opt out" of the
petroleum network. The initial dependence on the consumer has been
transformed into mutually compatible asymmetries, i. e., net inter -
dependence. Two consequences should be noted: First, the meager
resources and skills plus the high population growth of the developing
countries impede their chances of meeting the economic burden of
higher oil prices. Second, the producers' rejection of established
rules governing transactions is in turn being countered by the con-
sumers' search for a more equitable price system.
These conclusions need further inquiry and substantiation. Four
dimensions of interdependence were probed: (a) political and economic,
(b) security of access, (c) implication for community-building, and
(d) potential environmental impact (conclusions here are inferential
and of little depth).
A move to alternative sources of energy will be accelerated by
higher prices and forestalled by price reductions. The producers
therefore can and will influence the energy policy of the consumers.
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SUMMARY OF CHAPTER VII, VOLUME II
ALTERNATIVE GLOBAL ENERGY SYSTEMS
A. Perspectives for Assessing the Implications of Alternative
Energy Sources
The issue of energy in an interdependent world involves the cost
of developing alternatives to petroleum on a commercially viable
basis, secure access to stable sources, stable relationships between
producers and consumers, and minimal environmental dislocations.
Nations rich in petroleum are poor in technology and vice versa.
For coal, nuclear fission and fusion, solar energy, geothermal energy,
tar sands, oil shale, and other exotica, however, whoever controls
technology controls access to the resources.
B. Coal: Resource Base and Technological Constraints
World coal reserves can last over 800 years. By 1985 the United
States will have drawn on only 10% of the available 150 million tons that
are similar to currently mined resources.
Reliance on coal would reduce U. S. balance of payments deficits
by reducing oil imports. International monetary flexibility and domes -
tic employment would increase. No issue of strategic vulnerability
nor of potential competition with the U. S. S. R. would arise. Competi-
tion with Westner Europe and Japan for a scarce resource would decline
but interests might also diverge.
The environmental effects of present extraction processes present
technological difficulties which increase the costs of mining, processing,
transportation, and distribution. Health and safety measures are costly;
new facilities must replace those burning fuel oil; distribution networks
and facilities must be updated. Water resources constrain the large-
scale development of gas sification technology.
In sum, the United States would gain by reducing its vulnerability
to the policies of other nations, but at some domestic cost.
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C. Nuclear Energy: Fission and Fusion
The major disadvantages of nuclear fission are technological
failures, natural disasters, and susceptibility to human error or
sabotage. Advantages include fewer pollutants emitted, and less
mining and transportation costs, water pollution, and land distribution.
The immediate problem lies in the scarcity of fuel available until
1980 when breeder reactors, which offer lower thermal pollution,
cheaper electric energy, and more efficient use of uranium reserves,
are expected to become commercially viable. Also, some experts
still doubt the likelihood of avoiding accident should a plant lose its
emergency core cooling system. Given the long delay between the
generation of persistent pollutants in the form of radioactive liquids
and wastes and their appearance in the environment, countermeasures
may appear too late to avoid unacceptable pollution damage. In terms
of security, increased proliferation and the potential for terrorism
could be destabilizing. Regulation of the development, employment,
transference, and diffusion of nuclear energy presents a formidable
challenge.
Progress toward hydrogen fusion involves further development
of a relatively new science, plasma physics. No system of magnetic
containment of fusion reaction so far tested indicates that net production
of energy is economically feasible.
Although oil would remain a major energy source, e. g. , for trans -
portation, a U. S. energy system based on nuclear power would cut
petroleum imports and improve related balance of payments deficits.
However, higher capital costs reflected in higher costs of manufacture
may eventually affect the balance of payments adversely.
The United States controls 41% of the world's current capacity,
the United Kingdom 15%, the U. S. S. R. and France, 7% each. Usage
has been erratic because of technical and, environmental problems, but
is expected to double about every five years. It provides 1% of U. S.
needs now and is expected to provide from 15%-30% by 1985 to: close
the gap between energy supplies and a 6% annual increase in demand.
But obstacles remain. The "ultimate energy source" is not yet on the
operational horizon.
D. Solar Energy
The major obstacles to the use of solar energy are technological
and are unlikely to be solved in this century. Eventually it may supply
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20% of expected consumption. Because solar power is a renewable,
nonexhaustible source of energy, the major linkages among nations
will be technological and will reflect increasing dependence rather than
interdependence. The potential for control of -energy as a political
instrument will thus persist. No institutions are yet responsible for
anticipating the political and other implications of a world energy system
based on solar power.
E. Geothermal Energy
Geothermal heat is essentially a form of fossil nuclear energy
produced primarily by the decay of radioactive materials. There are
uncertainties regarding the size of recoverable reserves and the air
pollution resulting from the high sulfur content of the steam (or other
form of heat) brought to the surface.
The most optimistic projection of economically viable energy
from geothermal sources foresees up to 1% of anticipated U. S. needs
by 1985 being supplied (confined to areas of the West and Southwest).
Thus no impact is foreseen on either the national or world energy
system. Possibilities for technology transfer exist but are still too
limited to affect U. S. relations abroad.
F. Tar Sands and Shale Oil
Tar sands are distinguished from conventional oil and gas reser-
voirs by the viscosity of the hydrocarbon which cannot be recovered by
conventional processes. Canada, Venezuela, and perhaps Colombia,
have large deposits. The smaller U. S. deposits are not expected to
yield much energy with present technology. Canada will be the only
source of commercial production at least through 1985, but technologi-
cal, capital, and construction constraints will keep production limited.
Shale oil is an oil-bearing rock that may be burned directly and
distilled to obtain oil products. Plans to, develop the large U. S. deposits
are hindered by inadequate water supplies. Significant cost reductions
require the removal of bottlenecks in mine and plant organization, in
construction, and in further automation. The legal status of shale lands
must be resolved.
Reliance on tar sands and shale oil is unlikely to be sufficient to
affect U. S. relatipns with others.
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G. Global Interdependence and Alternative Energy Sources
For the United States, or other industrial countries, to invest in
alternatives to petroleum is to make some commitment toward energy
autonomy. For some, this autonomy would be too costly- -in political,
environmental, and dollar terms.
Because access to sources of energy is a basic requisite to
national survival in an industrialized world, and because every alter-
native requires technological developments which only the advanced
nations can make, the sharing or transferring- -or withholding--of
technology would become the most crucial issue confronting all nations,
large and small.
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SUMMARY OF CHAPTER VIII, VOLUME II
ALTERNATIVE ENERGY REGIMES AND
PATTERNS OF GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE
A. Control of Energy Sources
The control of petroleum and geothermal energy is geographically
determined. Nuclear fission and fusion are primarily technological
and control will lie with advanced nations. Both geography and tech-
nology determine the control of oil shale and tar sands.
B. Distribution of Energy Resources
Both economic and political factors determine distribution
patterns. Like petroleum, the transfer of nuclear technology can be
used as a political "weapon." For solar power, geothermal energy,
oil shale, and tar sands, economic factors will likely shape distribution.
C. The Issue of Price
As in the- case of petroleum prices, it is unlikely that the price
of nuclear energy will be directly related to cost, although control
over product, distribution, and price will rest with the advanced nations.
The latter will also control solar power, geothermal energy, oil shale,
and tar shale, but factors that might divorce cost from price are not
apparent. Economic factors will thus determine price.
D. Regulatory Mechanism for Alternative Energy Systems
Present-day institutions are inadequate for regulating the trans-
actions associated with alternative sources, and efforts must be made
in the next ten critical years to avoid incremental and piecemeal
approaches and the familiar snowballing process whereby a solution
generates other problems ad infinitum,
E. Alternative Energy Regimes: An Illusion
Alternatives for regulating international energy transactions
include (a) free market, (b) joint, (c) multilateral, and (d) international
regimes. Autarchy is not a viable option.
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Under a free market or joint system, control of energy products
would be determined by resource, capital, and technological factors,
distribution by market mechanism, and price -- the basic regulatory
mechanism--by supply and demand. Under a joint system, however,
the role of government would be more direct. Regimes under (c) or
(d) would differ substantially. Under (c) control would be designed to
maximize benefits to the group as a whole; under (d) resources would
be apportioned according to need. Community interests as well as
market mechanisms would determine distribution and price under (c).
Under (d) explicit rules and regulations would apply.
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SUMMARY OF CHAPTER I, VOLUME III
A METHODOLOGY FOR INTERDEPENDENCE RESEARCH*
A. Outstanding Questions
It is clear from the previous volumes that important but un-
answered research questions exist relating to, for example, what
trends, strategies and outcomes are likely, desirable, or possible.
B. Reasons for a Methodological Study
There is a need for a review of research techniques that have
relevance, as understanding emerges of what ought to be studied and
how it might be done.
C. The Methodological Strategy
A methodology is needed to assess the relevance of particular
techniques for interdependence research. Explicit, agreed-upon
methodologies are a prerequisite for fruitful communication between
and among the producers and consumers of the research.
Chapter II seeks to identify analytical problems common to the
different scholarly perspectives reviewed in Chapter II, Volume I, and
offers a methodological focus for interdependence research. In Chapter
III, this focus is further articulated in terms of precise canons (maxims)
from which the relevance of techniques or approaches can be judged.
Several dozen studies are reviewed, particularly those of Alker, Bloom-
field and Choucri. Although the techniques may be unfamiliar and
difficult to grasp, it is hoped that the multilevel conceptualization of
interdependence phenomena in Chapter IV will be generally intelligible
as an aid to clear thinking. Chapter IV also builds on Chapter III's
methodological maxims for possible use as questions to ask in review-
ing subsequent research proposals. As a concrete example, the steps
to be taken in studying commodity interdependencies are illustrated.
The Chapter is coauthored with Professor Choucri.
*Chapter I is by Hayward R. Alker, Jr.
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SUMMARY OF CHAPTER II, VOLUME III
COMMON ANALYTICAL PROBLEMS:
A PARTIALLY SYNTHETIC APPROACH*
This chapter suggests a partially synthetic methodological
approach to the analytical problems raised by the controversies and
policy issues of Volumes I and II, in the form of a design-oriented,
historical systems approach focused on cross-state world order
possibilities, emphasizing competing quasi-regime alternatives.
A. Common Analytical Problems in Interdependence Issues
As other actors become increasingly relevant to achieving
domestic and international objectives, it is harder but more necessary
to answer: who gets, or should get, what, why, when, and with what
side effects? Much of the discussion in Volume I evidenced growing
concern with restructuring relationships, i. e. designing new, if partial,
world orders to realize mutually satisfactory relationships. It is
necessary to consider simultaneously both policy and structure.
1. Mixed Interest, Interaction- Contingent, Collective Outcome
Dilemmas
The first common analytical problem falls under the
"Prisoner's Dilemma" label--a situation in which an independ-
ently acting player is tempted to "outdo" another, although a
cooperative outcome is actually to be preferred by both. The
collective outcome possibilities are dramatized by depletion of
ocean stocks or global inflation controls that affect everyone;
such outcomes are pure public (or collective) goods or bads.
When one party cannot by himself control the outcome, his
alternatives are interaction- contingent or sensitivity interde-
pendent.
Two parties are positively interest interdependent when the
action of one, taken in his own interest, enhances the other's
* Chapter II is by Hayward R. Alker, Jr.
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payoff. When one does well and the other poorly, the interest
interdependence is negative. Mixed interest situations fall
between the two.
Each of the issues raised in Volumes I and II has analy-
tical problems that can be characterized as mixed interest,
interaction- contingent, collective outcome dilemmas.
2. Pervasive Units of Analysis Problem
What interests, at what level, are to be analyzed? A
search for creative/regulative political orders requires studies
at close to the global level. The collection of units- -supranational,
transgovernmental, governmental or transnational- -collectively
referred to as cross-state actors, must be considered. More
cross-state data is needed.
3. The Need for Comparative Costing of Multiple Objectives
Making short-run policy payoffs and larger-run order-
building efforts commensurable involves taking account of re-
source and opportunity costs, political designs, the sensitivity
interdependence of multiple actors, and different commitments
to the values of autonomy, efficiency and equity.
4. The Instruments-Objectives Constraint
According to cybernetic theory, to achieve success there
must be as many independent policy instruments as there are
objectives. Complex questions will not be resolved unless policy
goals that can be administered flexibly are sufficiently articulated.
5. The Likelihood of Unanticipated Negative Consequences
Examples abound.
6. The Need for Counterfactual System Assessment
Are there feasible, preferable, as yet non-existing
(counterfactual) alternatives to systems of interdependence?
Vulnerability interdependence can be defined as the opportunity
costs of transforming relationships. Dependency is par excell-
ence the case of asymmetric vulnerability interdependence: one
side can break the relationship with relative ease, the other
cannot.
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B. Components of a Partially Synthetic Methodological Approach
Reconceptualizing certain questions can make the possibilities
for governmental action more apparent, likely, and effective.
1. A Historical Systems Approach
This is a combination of generalizing historical analysis,
a structure-sensitive viewpoint, and the elaborations of modern
systems theory.
2. A Focus on Partial World Order-Building Efforts
The Miriam Camps concept of interdependence is articulated
in pluralistic world order terms, e. g. progress toward disarm-
ament, peaceful change, improved welfare, human rights, and so
on. With differing emphases and conceptual interpretations,
conservatives, liberals and radicals all discuss the same objec-
tive s.
3. Design Research on Interdependence Alternatives
A third feature is analysis of alternative, artificial (in the
sense of requiring human effort) systems of global interdependence.
An artificial science requires a design orientation. Designs may
be thought of as interfaces between an inner environment (conceiv-
able as domestic public goods to be maintained) and an external,
natural, social, technological environment. A distinction between
ground rules, operating rules, and generative/ regulative norms
should also be preserved.
4. An Emphasis on Competing Cross-State Quasi-Regimes
A regime evidences mutuality of benefits: consensus on
rules; stability, coherence, effectiveness; and institutionalized
relationships. Rule systems satisfying only some of these are,
by default, quasi-regimes.
Energy politics is full of competing visions of what kinds
of world order should emerge. It is toward their analysis that
the present methodological framework has been developed.
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SUMMARY OF CHAPTER III, VOLUME III
METHODOLOGIES, MAXIMS, AND TECHNIQUES*
A. Methodological Maxims -for Interdependence Research
The historical systems approach to questions of world order
design, emphasizing competing cross-state quasi-regime alternatives,
can be restated in some twenty methodological maxims, within six-
topics suggested by Herbert Simon, that focus on what interdependence
research should look at.
Topic 1 The Representation of Interdependence Design Problems
An important representational feature of cross-state quasi-
regimes is their openness as systems. Making projections or predic-
tions about such systems requires knowledge of their resource and
information inputs and other exchanges with their environment. Multi-
ple objectives subject to multiple constraints can be compared by devel-
oping formalisms simultaneously representing equity, coercion, and
efficiency objectives. Conceptual typologies of regulative principles,
policy possibilities, and problem situations also belong here.
Topic 2 Theories of Natural and Social Environments
Maxim 1 Theoretical specifications (and hopefully models) should
be made of the dynamics and transformability of natural
and social environments external to contemplated regime
participants.
Since completely autonomous self-control is usually impos-
sible for open systems, the principles governing the behavior of
external environments are important design constraints.
*Chapter III is by Hayward R. Alker, Jr.
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Maxim 2
that does
ministic.
Maxim 3
But because such environments are rarely accurately
predictable, a probabilistic error treatment, using
appropriately specified random variables, is desirable
concerning parts of the environment not deterministically
modelable.
This maxim is grounded in an historical systems philosophy
not see social and natural processes as completely deter-
-Ascertain actual and potential information and resource
flows, including causal impacts from environments into
major actors and actual or potential regimes.
Projections based on systems of probabilistically deter-
minative equations, including internal bureaucratic pressures and
external threats, often explain more than half the variance in political
variables as, for example, armaments, territorial expansionism, and
violence (all in the 1892-96 period; cf. Choucri-North).
Maxim 4 Attention should be given to the potential, often-unantici-
pated impacts or side effects of quasi-regime alternatives
on natural environments, and on social groups whose
support is not necessary in the short run to sustain the
inner structure of quasi-regime practices.
The maxim embodies the insight, common to Marxist,
radical-liberal, neofunctionalist, and conservative theoretical tradi-
tions, that cross-state regimes depend on and reward the support of
important transnational social groups. Data must be tested for these
effects.
Maxim 5
Topic 3
The findings of scientific experts with different doctrinal/
value emphases must be examined, checked and compared
at least to the extent likely regime participants differ in
their environmental assessments.
Theoretical Analyses of Interdependence Practices
(Including Internal Environments and Regime Capabilities)
Maxim 6 A ctor-relevant time-specific actions, sensitivity effects,
resource costs, outcome trade-offs, and policy opportunity-
costs should be routinely part of analyses of interdepend-
ence practices.
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Maxim 7
Maxim 8
Policy analyses should, moreover, be structure sensitive,
making explicit estimates of the relevant impacts of
external environments, internal organizational constraints,
policies, and cross-state quasi-regimes.
The appropriate multiplicity of relevant cross-state actors
should be studied.
Difficult causal assessments, not usually made when inter-
action patterns are measured, are implied. The Choucri-North model
indicates how much work is involved. The Mesarovic-Pestel model
contains possibilities for multi-level impact assessments, joined with
an analysis routine showing the alternate effects, trade-offs, and
opportunity costs associated with different policy options. Forecasts,
alternative policies, and more specific implementation strategies can
all be explored.
Maxim 9 The subjective interests, preferences, identities, and
expectations of cross-state actors should be researched,
including their assessments of alternative interface
arrangements (including various regime possibilities).
Recently developed techniques make this possible with a
kind of third generation content analysis linked to cognitive processing
simulations.
Maxim 10 Judgments of actual (or hypothetical) system functions
should be supplemented, wherever appropriate, by explicit
theoretical statements of operational rule structures and
capability-loads analyses of them.
Various institutionalized practices (or quasi-regimes), e. g.
deterrence and crisis management, rest on assumptions about shared
ground rules. The capabilities of such practices to handle various
loads--crises, problems, or demands--should be assessed. One needs
to know which rules may operate in what context with what effects.
Maxim 11 Memory-rich specifications of quasi-regimes are to be
preferred over ahistorical ones because the performance,
reproduction, and self-transformation of historical systems
depend importantly on memory processing capabilities.
-46-
Modelers find this standard hard to meet. It emphasizes
the importance of human memory in innovative policy thinking, imple-
mented through systems such as the Bloomfield-Beattie CASCON.
Human and man-machine games are also important here.
Topic 4 Logics for Presc ribing/De scribing Interdependence Designs
Practical politicians use rhetoric, persuasion, and propa-
ganda to advantage. At a higher level of discussion rationality logics,
including variants of choice theory, cost/benefit analysis, and labor
value theory are used in making political arguments. Statistical
evidence and judgmental data must be mixed.
Topic 5 The Search for Successful Interdependence Politics
Systematic policy searching involves imagining alternative
regime prospects and multiple objectives. Learning from order-
building efforts, historical deterrence/ compellance actions or
political-military games how to enhance conflict resolution capabilities
requires identifying the design principles that prove successful plus
post-mortems of both succes.ses and failures. Thus:
Maxim 12
Maxim 13
Maxim 14
Maxim 15
Maxim 16
Topic 6
Maxim 17
More than one "possible world" should be considered.
Historical practices should be used in (re)designing
multiple alte rnative s.
Sequentially explicit design principles must be explicated.
Feasibility arguments should spell out and make plausible
the attainability of necessary and/or sufficient conditions
for each order-building stage.
Explicated regime construction or redesign principles must
be subject to post-mortem analyses.
The Evaluation of Cross-State Interdependence
Interdependence relationships, including regimes and less
consensual structures, should, at a minimum, be analyzed
for the efficiency, equity, autonomy, capacity, moderniza-
tion, and conservation objectives meaningful to potential
participants in such relationships.
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Maxim 18
Maxim 19
Maxim 20
Moreover, the use of such evaluative criteria should be
extended to include the opportunity costs for relevant actors
of quasi-regime alternatives.
As part of the scientific contribution to such discussions,
an appropriate mix of judgmental, rational, and complex
causal assessments should repeatedly be used in order to
ensure relatively comprehensive quasi-regime evaluations
in changing conditions of historical interdependence.
Public debate and cross-paradigm adversarial science are
necessary for the discovery of latent system functions
(such as inequity perpetuation) and the definition of quasi-
regime objectives susceptible to legitimate institutionali-
zation.
B. A Provisional Review of Research Technique Relevance to Inter-
dependence Analysis
Several conclusions emerge from a relevance scorecard for the
analytical techniques discussed:
Most techniques do not satisfy most maxims of relevance, let
alone harder tests of adequacy.
Techniques exist that move toward meeting almost any one of
the maxims of relevance the analytical context has suggested.
We do not know how factorable interdependence issues really are,
but the Mesarovic- Pestel model suggests a technique for simultane-
ously addressing several parts of the energy problems we have looked
at.
It is not the techniques per se but the guiding research programs
or methodological orientations that need discussion.
An historical systems approach to world order design questions,
emphasizing competing cross-state quasi-regime alternatives, has been
developed to address as many of the key concerns and analytical prob-
lems in the interdependence literature as possible. The next chapter
will suggest how this focus and its derivative maxims apply to partic-
ular research areas.
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SUMMARY OF CHAPTER IV, VOLUME III
METHODOLOGICAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS*
A. Six Analytical Meanings of Interdependence
Clarity is enhanced by distinguishing between (1) consumption
interdependence- -the flow of goods and services in ways whereby one
cross-state actor's consumption does not exclude that of others; (2) the
relations and structures that determine cross-state interactions
including resource flows; (3) the sensitivity, symmetric or asymmetric,
of an actor to others and/or to its natural or social environment; (4)
the degree of similarity in the stakes (utilities) nations attach to
certain goods, policies, or outcomes. Greater similarity means
greater positive utility interdependence; (5) cross-sectoral inter-
dependence, which concerns the functions performed by actors or
their subunits in realizing or frustrating overall objectives; and (6)
vulnerability interdependence- -the degree to which a cross-state actor
can transform its sensitivity, utility, and cross-sectoral interdepend-
encies.
The above encompass the definition of interdependence of Chapter
I, Volume I--that interdependence is a situation of two-way dependency
-- but also highlight the multi-dimensional and multi-faceted nature of
the phenomenon.
B. Implications for Analysis of Energy Interdependence
The six meanings illuminate the situation of global interdepend-
ence for petroleum thus:
1. Consumption Externalities Generated by Flows of Goods
and Services
The network of petroleum transactions is defined by im-
ports and exports in a situation of exchange with mutual gain.
*Chapter IV is by Hayward R. Alker, Jr. and Nazli Choucri.
-49-
2. Causal Relations Determining Actual or Potential Flows of
Goods and Services Across National Boundaries
Petroleum flows are structured by the need for resources
and by the values and preferences of the trading parties.
3. Cross-State Sensitivity
The policies of producers affect consumers and vice versa
(although less dire ctly).
4. Shared Utilities
Each party attaches extremely high stakes to the trans-
action- -the consumers to maintain modern economies, the producers
for national income.
5. Cross-Sectoral Interdependence
The economic consequences of petroleum flows have led to
mutual sensitivities in political and strategic areas.
6. Vulnerability Interdependence in Terms of the Asymmet-
rical Ability of One State to Reshape its Interrelationships
The consumers are vulnerable to price increases; the
producers to the freezing of foreign assets. The implications of vulner-
ability interdependence derive from all the preceding factors.
C. Applications of Maxims (of Chapter III) to the Analysis of Energy
Inte rdependence
Maxim 1
Maxim 2
Maxim 3
Theoretic specifications of the energy system must include
delineation of production, consumption, energy reserves,
and changes in such patterns 'over time.
Those aspects whose structure and behavior are not well
specified should be incorporated by a probabilistic error
system.
Delineate flows of energy and of the information and tech-
nology that condition them, to determine causal relations.
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Maxim 4
Maxim 5
Maxim 6
Maxim 7
Maxim 8
Maxim 9
Maxim 10
Maxim 11
Maxim 12
Maxim 13
Maxim 14
Maxim 15
Examine the unanticipated consequences of emerging flow
patterns and assess the stresses on prevailing regime rules.
Divergent definitions of reality emerging from different
scientific traditions must be taken into account.
Existing studies lack systematic investigation of oppor-
tunity costs.
Account must be taken of the impact of policy outcomes on
production, consumption, and basic reserves, and on OPEC
and the MNCs in terms of possible constraints on their
behavior.
A perspective is needed that ceases to downgrade the
producers' role in international politics.
Subjective assessments of the actors' interests, identities,
and expectations are needed to compensate for the ethno-
centric perspective of almost all current research.
Shared operational rule structures must be distinguished
from shared goals and objectives, e. g. while MNCs may
be "tax collectors" for the producers, there is not
necessarily collusion.
Important historical events and developments must be
specified.
Alternative regime designs are needed to place prevailing
patterns in perspective and point to alternatives not
intuitively obvious.
Analysis of producer/MNC/ consumer transactions, in the
1950's and on, is a necessary prelude to designing alterna-
tive futures.
The design principles looking to alternative regimes ought
to be predicated on alternative definitions of "reality" with
their implications explicitly articulated.
Delineating the requisite conditions for alternative regimes
must take account of natural and social environments and
the options available to each state.
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Maxim 16
Maxim 17
Maxim 18
Maxim 19
Maxim 20
The design must ensure that, at any point, developments
can be examined for their effect on prevailing regimes and,
by inference, alternative regimes.
The study of energy relationships needs to take into account
efficiency, autonomy, and the capability attributes of the
actors and the prevailing quasi-regimes.
The opportunity costs of alternative arrangements for each
nation must be made explicit.
As conditions change, a clearly specified mix of judgmental,
rational and causal assessments is critical.
Public debate should be encouraged on evaluation, assess-
ment, design, and institutional issues.
D. Generalizing the Above Approach
The methodological maxims can serve as a relevance checklist
in reviewing or formulating interdependence research.
There is need for more vigorous analysis along these lines of
other commodity flows, particularly of minerals. Information and
resource flows in the scientific and technological areas also need
study.
In sum, this volume recommends the consistent application of
a multi-faceted, design-oriented approach to the analysis of partial
global interdependencies.
